I have a few concerns with an OpenId Connect strategy that I would like to use and have been unable to find specifics on what the security concerns may be and any glaring issues with it I am overlooking.
Currently, I have an OpenId Connect implementation using Openiddict with Authorization Code flow. For the client, I have a React-Native app using react-native-app-auth.
I see from other questions on SO and from issues posted on the Openiddict repo that the recommended approach to third-party providers (e.g. Google) is: Client -> Auth server -> Google Auth -> Auth server -> Client/Auth server code and token exchange
However, it seems that a better approach from a UX standpoint (when using a SPA or native app) would be to implement something similar to GoogleSignIn on the client and either handle the identity on the server using an IdToken or authorization code from Google. This introduces an issue as the flow previously recommended could not be used as the entire initial challenge and redirect from Auth server to Google Auth has been skipped.
I have seen that this issue is mitigated by not using the authorization code grant and instead implementing a custom assertion grant. This seems to be an alright approach but would require exposing a custom grant and handling the flow differently on the client and server for local and third-party logins.
My proposed solution continues to use the authorization code flow and instead of adding a custom grant type the client could just pass a third-party identifier "Google" and the token or authorization code in the additional parameters of the OIDC authorize request. The authorize endpoint could then detect the provider and token, perform token validation, create a user or principal from it, and create an authorization code to send back to the client for the code/token exchange. This flow would look like the following:
1. Get the id token from the provider Client -> GoogleSignIn -> Client
2. Pass token to auth server and initiate code / token exchange Client -> Auth Server -> Auth server Verify Google IdToken (JWKS, issuer, audience, provider specific validation, etc...) or exchange auth code -> Auth server -> Client/Auth server code and token exchange
One downside to this approach would be the additional hops to verify the token on the server side. If the token was returned from GoogleSignIn, they themselves said that it could be trusted. https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/oauth2/openid-connect#obtainuserinfo
I see that it is generally recommended to place the auth server between the client and the third-party but in this process the server is still between the client and auth server but only after the initial exchange from the client and third-party.
Questions,
In general am I missing something with this flow?
In this case would it be necessary to verify the token on the server side?
Is there some better way to approach this that I have completely overlooked?
Am I making this too complicated and UX should not be this much of a concern?
Instead of adding the provider and token to the additional parameters would it make more sense to pass it in the body of a post request? I don't see the issue with passing it via query string but that's also part of the reasoning for the authorization code grant from my understanding.
Apologies in advance for anything I have missed or omitted for brevity that should have been included.
Thanks.
ARCHITECTURE
I'm not sure I understand the UX problem - your existing architecture feels really good. If you want to login directly to Google, just send an acr_values=google
query parameter in the authorization redirect, to bypass any authentication selection screens. The exact value will depend on how Openiddict represents the Google authentication option, and some providers use a non-standard parameter such as idp
. Have a closer look at the OIDC request parameters.
A key OAuth goal is that the Authorization Server (AS) - Openiddict in your case - shields your apps from all of the provider differences and deals with their nuances and vendor specific behaviour. Your apps then also only receive one type of token, and only ever use simple code. As an example, the Curity AS supports all of these options, none of which requires any code in applications.
APPAUTH AND UX
If a user is already signed in then it can, as you say, look unnatural to spin up the system browser and them it is dismissed immediately.
A common option is to show the consent screen or an interstitial page to keep the user informed - and the user clicks one extra button. This can also be useful for getting password autofill to work. My code example and blog post shows how this might look, though of course you can improve on my basic UX.
OFFLINE ACCESS
I find this term misleading, since refresh tokens are most commonly used when the user is there. Are you just asking how to deal with tokens in a mobile client? Aim for behaviour like this:
Note also that mobile apps can save tokens to encrypted secure mobile storage that is private to the app. This can improve usability, eg by avoiding logins every time the app is restarted. You should think through scenarios such as stolen devices and token lifetimes though.