Is it sufficient to have [System.Web.Configuration.HttpRuntimeSection.EnableHeaderChecking
](http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/system.web.configuration.httpruntimesection.enableheaderchecking(VS.85).aspx) set to true
(default) to fully prevent Http Header Injection attacks like Response Splitting etc.?
I'm asking because a white box penetration testing tool (fortify) reports exploitable http header injection issues with HttpResponse.Redirect
and cookies but I haven't found a way to successfully perform an attack. (edit:..and we have EnableHeaderChecking turned on..)
I've been looking at this for some time now and draw the conclusion that setting EnableHeaderChecking to true
is in fact good enough to prevent http header injection attacks.
Looking at 'reflected' ASP.NET code, I found that:
HttpResponseHeader
(internal)HttpResponseHeader.MaybeEncodeHeader
(for IIS7WorkerRequests
)HttpResponseHeader
instances are created before known headers like RedirectLocation or ContentType are sent (HttpResponse.GenerateResponseHeaders
)HttpResponseHeader
constructor checks the EnableheaderChecking setting and calls HttpResponseHeader.MaybeEncodeHeader
when set to true
HttpResponseHeader.MaybeEncodeHeader
correctly encodes newline characters which makes HTTP header injection attacks impossibleHere is a snippet to roughly demonstrate how I tested:
// simple http response splitting attack
Response.AddHeader("foo", "bar\n" +
// injected http response, bad if user provided
"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n" +
"Content-Length: 19\n" +
"Content-Type: text/html\n\n" +
"<html>danger</html>"
);
The above only works if you explicitly turn EnableHeaderChecking off:
<httpRuntime enableHeaderChecking="false"/>
Fortify simply doesn't take configuration into account (setting EnableHeaderChecking explicitly had no effect) and thus always reports these type of issues.